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Abstract: With the increase in the number of threats within Web-based systems, a more 
integrated approach is required to ensure the enforcement of security policies from the server to 
the client. These policies aim to stop man-in-the-middle attacks, code injection, and so on. This 
paper analyses some of the newest security options used within HTTP responses, and scans the 
Alexa Top 1 Million sites for their implementation within HTTP responses. These options 
scanned for include: Content Security Policy (CSP); Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP 
(HPKP); HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) and HTTP Header Field X-Frame-Options 
(XFO), in order to understand the impact that these options have on the most popular Web sites. 
The results show that, while the implementation of the parameters are increasing, they are still 
not implemented on many of the top sites. Along with this the paper shows the profile of 
adoption of Let’s Encrypt digital certificates across the one million sites, along with a way of 
assessing the quality of the security headers. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
With HTTP, we have a request, such as GET request, and the server responds with a 
response. These responses contain header information which includes parameters defined in a list 
of key:value pairs (1). There are many standard application layer protocols that are used to 
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exchange information, including HTTP (1), SMTP (2), FTP (3) and DNS (4). These 
specifications were often written to support a simple text-based exchange of messages. Some of 
these are stateless, such as for DNS and HTTP, while others, such as SMTP and FTP, require a 
session to be created, with commands and responses. At the time, too, security was often an 
after-thought, and where the application layer protocols were improved for their security with the 
addition of the secure socket layer (SSL), such as with HTTPs (5).  
While SSL and TLS purely protected the contents of the message exchange, the addition of 
CSP – Content Security Policy - (6) integrates a policy language that sets content restrictions on 
a web resource, and where the server transmits the policy to the client, for it to enforce the policy.  
New security extensions have also been added to prevent MITM (Man-in-the-Middle) attacks, 
such as the Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP (HPKP) (7) and which allows a site to 
associate itself with specific cryptographic public keys and thus protects against forged digital 
certificates. Within HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) (8) a web server can require that a 
client (and its associated Web browser) should only interact with it through a secure connection 
(such as with HTTPS). In 2013, RFC 7034 defined  HTTP Header Field X-Frame-Options (9), 
which protects web applications against clickjacking, and against the integration of code from 
non-trusted sources. Again the focus is on the server informing the client of its policy and 
configuration options.  
This paper analyses the usage of these new security features within the Alexa Top 1 
Million sites, in order to identify the impact of the roll-out of the security response headers. It 
can be seen, in Figure 2, that the response headers include: Content-Security-Policy; Content-
Security-Policy-Report-Only; Public-Key-Pins; Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only, X-Content-Type-
Only, X-Frame-Options, and X-Xss-Protection. Along with this, the adoption of Let’s Encrypt 
(10) shows an interesting move towards the usage of free digital certificates. The analysis will 
thus also look at its adoption, and see if the top million sites are using the Let’s Encrypt 
certificate authority.  
2. Background 
While SSL/TLS purely protects the content of the data exchange, the addition of CSP [1] 
provided a policy language that could set content restrictions on the web resource, and where the 
server transmits the policy to the client, for it to enforce the policy.  New security extensions 
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have also been added to prevent MITM (Man-in-the-Middle) attacks, such as the Public Key 
Pinning Extension for HTTP (HPKP) [23] which  allows a site to associate itself with specific 
cryptographic public keys and protects against forged digital certificates. With HTTP Strict 
Transport Security (HSTS) [24] a web server can require that a client (and its associated Web 
browser) should only interact with it through a  secure connection (such as with HTTPS). 
RFC 7034 added HTTP Header Field X-Frame-Options [25], which protects web 
applications against clickjacking, and within the integration of content from other web pages. 
Again the focus is on the server telling the client its policy and configuration options. Response 
headers include: Content-Security-Policy; Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only; Public-Key-
Pins; Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only, X-Content-Type-Only, X-Frame-Options, and X-Xss-
Protection. 
Overall the Web focuses on a same-origin policy (11), where the script contained in one 
origin is only permitted to access data within that origin, and thus each origin is isolated from 
others. Unfortunately, this overly restricts developers, along with attackers using clear tricks to 
inject malicious code from other domains. Many media sites often, too, use content and scripts 
from other sites and would struggle to support content which restricted them to their own site.  
The integration of code from other sites can lead to the problem of cross-site scripting (XSS) 
attacks, as the code within the Web page is often full trusted. Within CSP we thus have a number 
of methods that protect against XSS. With this CSP supports multiple policies for a resource, 
either in a Content-Security-Policy header or within the <meta> element, such as (11): 
 
Content-Security-Policy: default-src https: 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src https:"> 
 
One of the most powerful features of CSP is to define the whitelist for the client to use. A 
common problem is thus that a browser will trust all of the code in a page, so that content from 
other sites are trusted, so, within CSP, the Content-Security-Policy HTTP header is used to 
define the trusted sources, and where where no other sources of content can be used. For 
example, if we only wanted code from https://asecuritysite.com we could use: 
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://asecuritysite.com 
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In this case we are trusting our own source code (‘self’) and any scripts from 
https://asecuritysite.com. When code is injected into the page from another source, an error will 
appear.  For content, we can also restrict the location that images, media, plug-ins, style sheets 
and other objects can be installed from using the directives of: 
• img-src. Defines the sources for images. 
• media-src. Defines the sources for audio and video. 
• object-src. Defines the sources for plug-ins, such as Adobe Flash. 
• style-src. Defines the sources for stylesheets. 
• font-src. Defines the sources for fonts.  
• script-src. Defines the sources for all scripts. 
By default, all of the directives are open, so if a directive is not set it will allows all for that 
part of the policy.  If certain plug-ins could compromise the page, we can limit them with:  
plugin-types: and which defines the plug-in types that can be trusted by the browser. For 
example, we can allow PDF and Flash plug-ins with: 
 
Content-Security-Policy: plugin-types application/pdf 
Content-Security-Policy: plugin-types application/pdf application/x-
shockwave-flash 
 
HTTPS sourced content is now often preferred to HTTP, as the traffic can be protected 
against an attacker spying on the contents of data packets, along with a secure tunnel being 
created between the client and the server. Thus CSP supports a restriction on requests so that 
HTTP requests are automatically rewritten to HTTPS one. This is defined as part of the CSP 
policy with: 
Content-Security-Policy: upgrade-insecure-requests 
 
and which will rewrite this code: 
<img src="http://asecuritysite.com/good.png"> 
 
to: 
<img src="https://asecuritysite.com/good.png"> 
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A powerful feature of CSP is that the client should not execute on a policy violation, but 
will report it back to the server. For this we have a reporting URI (report-uri:) to define the 
location to post the report back to. We can also restrict the URLs on a page using: base-uri: and 
which restricts embedded frame contents to the <base> element; and child-src:. For example:  
 
child-src https://youtube.com  
 
enables the embedding of videos from YouTube, but not from other origins. For example 
we may restrict iframes to https://youtube.com with: 
 
Content-Security-Policy: child-src https://youtube.com/ 
 
And where the following would be blocked: 
 
<iframe src="https://fake-youtube.com"></iframe> 
 
An example attack is to redirect the parameters posted from a form. With CSP we can thus 
restrict the end-points with: form-action: and this defines the endpoints for the <form> tag. 
While whitelisting helps in detecting code being run from non-trusted sources, one of the 
greatest threats within XSS is related to inline script injection (12), such as for: 
<script>someEvilCode();</script> 
CSP overcomes this problem by banning any form of inline script tags, along with inline 
event handlers and in the form of: 
javascript: URL 
3. Literature Review 
1. Content Security Policy 
The risk around web security increases by the day, with OWASP defining their Top 10 
risks (13) and include: Broken Authentication And Session Management; Cross Site Scripting; 
Insecure Direct Object References; Security Misconfiguration; Sensitive Data Exposure; Missing 
Function Level Access Control; and Cross Site Request Forgery. Along with this different 
methods are defined in order to define a risk score (14). While many companies now concentrate 
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on the OWASP Top 10, other risks exist, such as where the HTTP headers can be used as a 
source of hiding information (15). 
The increasing focus of Web Application Vulnerabilities, especially for Cross Site 
Scripting (XSS) and Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), has led to a call for the creation of 
applications which are free from vulnerabilities (16). In the real-world, this is likely to be 
difficult, especially where there is a loose coupling between the front-end, middleware and back-
end Web infrastructure. CSP thus integrates into a layered approach to security and uses content 
restrictions, and a content restrictions enforcement scheme.   
The researchers within (17) created a CSP implementation to successfully mitigate a wide 
range of XSS attack against in four popular browsers. They define that an XSS attack is either:   
• Persistent XSS. This type stores the script on the server, such as in a database, and will thus 
run each time the associated page is accessed. 
• Non-persistent XSS. This type hides some malicious script and tricks the user in running the 
harmful script, in order to steal authentication cookies or data (18). 
• DOM-based XSS. This type of attack modified the DOM structure of a Web page, in order 
that it runs the code in a comprised way. 
Using CSP, they used a collection of XSS attacks from (18) and 50 unique ones, for the 
different attack types, from Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Opera. Their results showed 37 
successful attacks against Firefox, 19 against Chrome, Safari and Opera, while using CSP 
reduced the success rates of all of the attacks to zero. 
As with many advancements within web development the adoption of CSP has been slow 
and where problems still exist, such as with insecure server-side JavaScript generation. In (19), 
the authors propose PreparedJS an extension to CSP. It does this using a safe script templating 
mechanism and a light-weight script checksum scheme. In (20), Google analysed CSP identify 
flaws that can be bypassed in 94.72% of all distinct policies, and use a search engine corpus of 
around 100 billion pages from over 1 billion hostnames. This 1,680,867 hosts with CSP 
deployed and 26,011 unique CSP policies. In their paper, they identify three common methods 
for bypassing CSP. One of the key factors they identify as a weakness is that 75.81% of distinct 
policies use a whitelist that is too lax and can be used to bypass the CSP.  
Within (21), van Goethem T et al analysed over 22,000 websites within 28 EU countries 
and found the presence of common vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and that the adoption of 
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improved defense mechanisms, tended to be focused on the popular sites. Also Chen (37) 
provided an analysis of 18,000 European websites over a two-year period, and analysed the 
adoption of client-side security methods, and found that the finance and education sectors were 
the most successful in their adoption. 
2. Scanning 
The scanning of the Alexa sites is a well-defined method of understanding the changing 
nature of the request, such as in the ever-changing behaviour of HTTP web pages, and, for 
example, where (22) found a trend towards large pages including multimedia content, and in 
dynamic content creation. Within (23) the authors have outlined the usage patterns HTTP request 
messages, including and found that they vary greatly in the number, field names and field values. 
Other protocols too, such as with SMTP have been shown to leak information (24) and where the 
metadata used in sending emails can be used to determine system data which could lead to a 
compromise. For (25), the researchers analysed the HTTPS certificates from Censys, and 
Certificate Transparency (CT) logs. In this work, they surveyed the top one million Alexa sites, 
and they found that aggregated CT logs and Censys snapshots cover 99% of all certificates found. 
Recent work has involved large-scale vulnerability analysis of web infrastructures, such as 
in China (26) using 57,112 Web vulnerability incidents, and creating new threat models which 
understand the modern vulnerabilities (27). Unfortunately, the usage of security headers still 
seems to be taking a while to make a significant impact on the most popular web sites.  
With the increasing threat around XSS attacks, (28) analysed  the adoption rate of CSP for 
the 100 most popular sites, and found that only 8% of them used in January and June 2015. On a 
larger scan they found an adoption of 0.066% and 0.133% used in January and June 2015, 
showing a 73% increase.  
3. Let’s Encrypt 
There are many risks around digital certificates, including man-in-the-middle attacks and 
fake certificates (29). One of the major problems with them is that they are often expensive to 
purchase, thus the Let's Encrypt initiative looks to create a Certificate Authority ecosystem that 
is free to use and automates certificate signing (30). It is focused on Certificate Transparency 
(10). In (31) the authors analyse data from Certificate Transparency Logs of over 18 million 
certificates. This uses sources such as Censys, Alexa's historic records, Geolocation databases, 
and VirusTotal. In their results that only 54% of domains use the certificates which they have 
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acquired and that there were many occurrences of misconfigured servers, along with evidence of 
use of Let's Encrypt certificates used in malware-laden sites.  
4. HTTP Public-key pinning (HPKP) 
Back in 2011 a Dutch CA called DigiNotar was hacked (32). After gaining access to their 
systems, the hackers managed to make their way to the CA servers and issued over 500 rogue 
certificates to themselves. Included in those certificates was one for the google.com domain. This 
certificate was used to launch a Man in The Middle (MiTM) attack against 300,000 Iranian users 
of Google services, including GMail. From the end user perspective, the attack was undetectable. 
The browser received a certificate for the domain, it was valid and the chain of trust was intact. 
They had all the indicators of a secure connection but it was compromised. There was a lot of 
speculation about who was responsible for the hack, but from the host's perspective, their users 
were compromised without any way for them knowing.  
In 2008, and again in 2011, the StartCom CA was breached (33). The 2008 breach, carried 
out by a security researcher, resulted in rogue certificates being issued for the paypal.com and 
verisign.com domains. The 2011 breach, carried out by an unknown attacker, came very close to 
the crown jewel, the StartCom root key. With access to the StartCom root key, the attacker could 
have generated a certificate for any domain they like, but not only that, it would have led to the 
necessary revocation and reissue of every single certificate issued by StartCom.  
Presently there are hundreds of CAs who are able to issue digital certificates, and which 
can lead to fraudulent certificates. Public-Key-Pins (PKP), initially stated by Google, enables site 
owners to define the certificates which are valid for their site, and was defined in RFC 7469 (7). 
In (34) the author believes that it is difficult and dangerous to use, as it can be easily to block 
much of the access to Web sites. A problem is the memory effect, where a pin once set will then 
remain valid for a period of time.  
Within (35) the researchers outline the implementation of HPKP, and where Web servers 
inform their clients that they must remember (or “pin”) their public keys. They outline that HSTS 
and HPKP are new features to enforce HTTPS connections and allow certificate pinning over 
HTTP, but that the adoption has been poor, and where the implementation is also weak in terms 
of security. For this they have already found possible attacks against HSTS and HPKP. In 2015, 
Kranch (36) analysed the adoption of HSTS and KPKP and found evidence that the adoption of 
the features were not well understood by developers, and many sites had problems such as 
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loading non-pinned resources which could be used to hijack  the  page, and where  pinned  
domains could leak cookie values. 
4. Methodology 
Previous scans of security headers, such as for CSP have been achieved on a fairly limited 
scan (28), and while (20) has achieved a wide-spread scan of CSP policies, its focus has been on 
breaching CSP. This paper outlines two main scans of the Alexa Top 1 Million in Aug 2015 and 
May 2017. For Content Security Policy, the scanner checked for the following headers: Content-
Security-Policy (CSP); Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only (CSPRO). This response header 
can be used by developers to understand the effects of policy enforcement, and where a JSON 
document is sent back as an HTTP POST to a defined URI; X-Webkit-CSP (XWC); and X-
Content-Security-Policy (XCSP). 
In  (17), the authors found that the Content-Security-Policy header is supported by Firefox 
Version 23, Chrome Version 25, Safari Version 7 and iOS Safari Version 7.1, and later versions, 
hile the X-Content-Security-Policy and X-WebKit-CSP headers were used within earlier browser 
versions. Often, to ensure compatibility, administrators configure both the X-Content-Security-
Policy and Content-Security-Policy headers. For other header scans, the following are detected: 
Public-Key-Pins (PKP); Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only (PKPRO); Strict-Transport-Security 
(STS).; X-Content-Type-Options (XCTO); X-Frame-Options (XFO); X-XSS-Protection (XXP); 
X-Download-Options (XDO); and X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies (XPCDP). 
Alongside this the scanner recorded the redirection of HTTP to HTTPS, such as is the case 
for google.com or facebook.com, where the crawler will default to http:// (domain name) and 
follow redirects until they are complete. Other metrics are also captured: Access-Control-Allow-
Origin (ACAO): this header can be used to define that only content from the origin site can be 
allowed; Let's Encrypt: this defines if the certificates are generated from Let’s Encrypt; and 
securityheaders.io grade: this providers a score for the security headers. 
A key objective of the work is to understand the trends in using the security headers as we 
move through the one million site. Thus, we group into 4,000 servers and count the headers for 
each range. The following shows a capture from the first few headers for a scan in May 2017: 
 
Site from Site to Skipped CSP CSPRO 
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1 4,000 591 148 45 
4,001 8,000 551 106 18 
8,001 12,000 622 82 19 
 
The scoring for the headers is based on the security benefit that they offer and the ease of 
their deployment (https://securityheaders.io/). As the security benefit or the difficulty increases, 
the score increases. These are the values awarded: 
 
        // The value to award headers. 
        $values = array("strict-transport-security" => 25, 
                        "content-security-policy" => 25, 
                        "public-key-pins" => 30, 
                        "x-frame-options" => 20, 
                        "x-xss-protection" => 20, 
                        "x-content-type-options" => 20); 
 
By far the most difficult header to deploy and the one that offers the most protection is 
HPKP, which scores the highest value. It is not possible to score an A+ without deploying HPKP 
due to its high value. Next are HSTS and CSP which both score equal value due to have some 
deployment considerations and offering a significant amount of protection. The 'X' headers all 
score equally as they are simple enough to deploy and offer a worthwhile level of protection for 
their low complexity. As for the % grading bands, these are designed such that sites can easily 
elevate themselves from the lower grades to encourage further improvements but a distinct effort 
is required to achieve an A, where all headers except HPKP are needed, and an A+ which does 
require all headers be present and properly deployed. 
This gives a total score for HTTPS sites of 140 whilst HTTP sites have a total score of 85 
as HPKP and HSTS are ignored by the browsers if delivered over an insecure connection. Each 
header that the site returns is tested against the headers that are awarded a score for a case-
insensitive match and if one is found the header value is then checked for correct syntax. If these 
checks pass, then the site is awarded the score associated with that header. Sites cannot be 
awarded the score for the same header a second time if the header is duplicated. The grade 
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awarded to the site depends on the % of the total possible score that they achieved and uses the 
following criteria: 
% of total achieved Grade awarded 
0-13 F 
14-28 E 
29-49 D 
50-59 C 
60-74 B 
75-95 A 
95-100 A+ 
 
In the work reported here, each crawl of the Alexa Top 1 Million was completed over a 
period of approximately 12 hours using a single server.  The server breaks the Top 1 Million list 
into 250 smaller lists of 4,000 sites and then runs 250 crawler threads concurrently to 
dramatically reduce the time taken to crawl all 1 million sites.   The crawler is written in PHP 
and uses the cURL library to issue requests, the results are stored in a MySQL database. This 
was executed on a virtual server emulating an Intel x64 system hosted by Digital Ocean running 
Ubuntu 14.04. The Alexa data is provided as a comma separated file in the format rank, 
hostname e.g. 1,google.com and 2,youtube.com, and so on. 
The crawler defaults to communicating with the site over HTTP by simply concatenating 
the “http://” string with the hostname provided in the Alexa data “http://hostname”.  The crawler 
will issue this initial GET request and then follow all redirects until completion with a timeout on 
requests set to 10 seconds, and it simulates a modern browser by setting a User-Agent string with 
the value: 
 
 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like 
Gecko) Chrome/52.0.2743.82 Safari/537.36'.  
 
Once the crawler has received a final response it parses the response and searches for 
strings matching the headers being sought.  If a response contains one of the headers being 
sought, this is marked on the appropriate entry in the database.   
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Importantly a site is only marked as supporting HTTPS if it redirects the client request 
from HTTP to HTTPS as only such sites are truly capitalising on HTTPS: few users will enter 
HTTPS as part a URL being sought so unless HTTP defaults to HTTPS the authors feel HTTPS 
is nugatory, and hence should not be counted. In the reporting-only versions, such as CSPRO and 
PKPRO, the response header can be used by developers to understand the effects of policy 
enforcement, and where a JSON document is sent back as an HTTP POST to a defined URI. 
This work does log such headers for completeness, but we do not attach a great significance to 
them as indicating the level of security of a site if they are used without other appropriate 
headers.   
5. Results 
A scan of Alexa Top One Million sites took less than 12 hours in May 2017. Table 1 and 
Figure 1 outlines the results. Figure 1 outlines the results from the scan, within groups of 4,000. 
Overall we can see a spike in adoption at the top end of the ranking, followed by a sharp decline, 
and then a steady tail off as you move down the rankings.  In May 2017, CSPRO and PKP both 
saw weak results, with an adoption rate of less than 1%. The results show a large increase in the 
number of sites that have a CSP deployed and have a healthy boost in the number of sites with a 
PKP policy deployed too. Another improvement is a large rise in the number of sites deploying 
the report-only version of these policies: CSPRO and PKPRO. A 387.2% increase in the number 
of sites testing out a CSPRO policy shows perhaps that many organisations are now looking to 
deploy a full version of CSP. Along with this there is a 302% increase in the number of sites 
issuing an STS policy and with an increase the number of sites redirecting to HTTPS by over 
236%. 
Figure 2 shows the CSP graph for the May 2017 scan. The trend is simulator across the 
results with the only difference being the scale on the Y axis has increased. The same 
comparison can be drawn for all of the other headers, and even for the deployment of HTTPS.  
The public key pinning (PKP) header was only found on 6,624 out of 1,000,000 sites 
(Figure 3), and is one of the most under-utilised security based HTTP response header (0.79%). 
The increasing adoption for PKP for lower ranked sites is thought to relate to the adoption of 
PKP within the Tumblr sites.  
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The most widely used of the non 'X' headers is Strict Transport Security, and is used on 
45,527 of the sites making for a 5.41% usage rate (Figure 4). This is still fairly low for the one 
million most visited. Interestingly, of the 1 million sites, 208,710 of them (24.78%) were actively 
redirecting to HTTPS on their domain, which leaves 163,183 domains that are redirecting to 
HTTPS, but not enforcing it with STS.  
For the more common 'X' headers, there is a clear-cut distinction between these and the 
remaining headers in terms of the number of sites that use them (Figure 5). The XFO header is 
by far the most prevalent security based header in use at 93,601 sites (11.11%) and shows the 
same downward trend as the rest. Interestingly, though, the XCTO and XXSSP headers both 
show similarly high usage at 89,053 (10.57%) and 70,032 (8.31%) respectively, but, after their 
initial dip they actually show an upward trend as you move down the list, which goes against the 
trend of all other headers. 
One of the other things that the crawler was looking for was how many of the domains 
would redirect to HTTPS if you loaded them over HTTP on the first request (Figure 6). As 
mentioned previously, a total of 208,710 sites redirected to HTTPS (24.78%), and we can see the 
same downward trend as we move down the list of domains.  
The vast majority of sites scored an F grade on the securityheaders.io scan. This means 
they either do not issue any security-based HTTP headers, or they do, and they are not 
configured properly. Table 2 highlights just how wide the gap is. Unfortunately, the sheer 
number of sites getting an F pretty much drowns out the rest, but you can still see trends. The 
further down the ranking you go, the more likely you are to get an F grade, with the spikes in the 
better grades just visible at the bottom.  
As expected the usage of Let's Encrypt certificates increases as you go down the rankings 
(Figure 7). There is also the factor that Let's Encrypt do not issue EV certificates, so probably 
cannot cater for a few of the sites either. (31) scanned the Alexa sites from 29 July to 29 August 
2016, and found 8% of the million sites containing Let’s Encrypt sites, compared with 30% for 
Comodo and 17% for GeoTrust. In their Common Crawl method, they found that Let’s Encrypt 
was used in 24% of the sites found, with Comodo at 21%. They found that 1.2% of the Alexa top 
million, for May 2017, have transitioned from paid CAs to Let’s Encrypt, while we found 5.29%. 
In Figure 7 we see that the adoption of Let’s Encrypt certificates is weaker for the top sites. In 
Table 3 we see that the adoption of the Let’s Encrypt in the top sites is fairly weak, and only has 
Page 13 of 24
IET Review Copy Only
IET Information Security
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited.
Content may change prior to final publication in an issue of the journal. To cite the paper please use the doi provided on the Digital Library page.
14 
 
an adoption of 0.6%, while the sites near the end of the top one million sites have and adoption 
rate of between 4.5% and 5.8%.  
6. Conclusions 
All-in-all the metrics are promising, with an increase in usage of the security headers. It is 
likely that we will see increases in the use of CSP and CSPRO. Overall we see the increasing in 
the reporting of security headers, many companies could now be investigating the usage of the 
enhanced security methods, and there could be a considerable increase in future scans. It is, 
perhaps, problems around the deployment of CSP that its impact is not quite as significant as it 
could be (34). 
The increase in sites redirecting to HTTPS is gathering pace fast. The securityheaders.io 
scores were a little poor, but there is plenty of opportunity for easy improvements to be made 
with the simpler X-based headers. For Let’s Encrypt certificates, we see the great impact away 
from the top site, with the Top 4000 sites only have an adoption rate of 0.6%, while we go up to 
5.3% for the bottom 4,000 sites in the top million. The results tally with (31), but also contribute 
in the trend of the general increase in adoption as we move down the ranking, which ends up 
between 4.5% and 5.8%.  
The future work continues to enhance the scoring system, and also to access more than one 
page from the web sites. At present the method only accesses the home page of the site, and does 
not sample other pages. 
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Figure 1: Header utilisation (May 2017) 
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 Figure 2: CSP (May 2017) 
 
Figure 3: PKP 
Page 19 of 24
IET Review Copy Only
IET Information Security
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited.
Content may change prior to final publication in an issue of the journal. To cite the paper please use the doi provided on the Digital Library page.
20 
 
20 
 
 
Figure 4: STS 
 
 
Figure 5: X headers 
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 Figure 6: HTTPS redirection 
 
 Figure 7:  Let’s Encrypt 
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Table 1: Results (Aug 2015 and May 2017) 
Aug 
2015 Aug 2015 
May 
2017 
May 
2017 % change 
CSP 1,365 0.1476% 13,253 1.5736% 870.92% 
CSPRO 211 0.0228% 1,028 0.1221% 387.20% 
XWCSP 183 0.0198% 362 0.0430% 97.81% 
XCSP 304 0.0329% 921 0.1094% 202.96% 
PKP 148 0.0160% 6,624 0.7865% 
4375.68
% 
PKPRO 21 0.0023% 87 0.0103% 314.29% 
STS 11,308 1.2231% 45,527 5.4057% 302.61% 
XCTO 44,315 4.7933% 89,053 
10.5739
% 100.95% 
XFO 55,042 5.9536% 93,601 
11.1139
% 70.05% 
XXSSP 41,948 4.5373% 70,032 8.3154% 66.95% 
XDO 192 0.0208% 7,134 0.8471% 
3615.63
% 
XPCDP 346 0.0374% 6,993 0.8303% 
1921.10
% 
HTTPS 62,043 6.7108% 208,710 
24.7815
% 236.40% 
 
 
Table 2: Security header scores 
Security 
Headers % 
A+ 
0.0071
% 
A 0.1003
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% 
B 
0.2318
% 
C 
3.2153
% 
D 
5.6908
% 
E 
8.0063
% 
F 
82.7401
% 
 
Table 3: Let’s Encrypt certificate distribution 
Site position Number 
Percentag
e (%) Site position Number 
Percentage 
(%) 
1-4000 25 0.6 
900001-
904000 197 4.9 
4001-8000 62 1.6 
904001-
908000 197 4.9 
8001-12000 77 1.9 
908001-
912000 199 5 
12001-16000 87 2.2 
912001-
916000 195 4.9 
16001-20000 93 2.3 
916001-
920000 180 4.5 
20001-24000 103 2.6 
920001-
924000 199 5 
24001-28000 77 1.9 
924001-
928000 207 5.2 
28001-32000 103 2.6 
928001-
932000 208 5.2 
32001-36000 105 2.6 
932001-
936000 210 5.3 
36001-40000 105 2.6 
936001-
940000 194 4.9 
40001-44000 125 3.1 940001- 206 5.2 
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944000 
44001-48000 119 3 
944001-
948000 191 4.8 
48001-52000 124 3.1 
948001-
952000 144 3.6 
52001-56000 127 3.2 
952001-
956000 232 5.8 
56001-60000 122 3.1 
956001-
960000 191 4.8 
60001-64000 109 2.7 
960001-
964000 233 5.8 
64001-68000 117 2.9 
964001-
968000 189 4.7 
68001-72000 144 3.6 
968001-
972000 113 2.8 
72001-76000 152 3.8 
972001-
976000 203 5.1 
76001-80000 109 2.7 
976001-
980000 224 5.6 
80001-84000 133 3.3 
980001-
984000 182 4.6 
84001-88000 110 2.8 
984001-
988000 205 5.1 
88001-92000 129 3.2 
988001-
992000 211 5.3 
92001-96000 124 3.1 
992001-
996000 207 5.2 
96001-100000 138 3.5 
996001-
1000000 213 5.3 
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